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INTRODUCTION
Stephan Landsman*
The current legal wars about tobacco products and handguns under-
score the continuing importance of American judges as tort
lawmakers. Since at least the time of the great Benjamin Cardozo,
American judges have been key, albeit sometimes reluctant, players in
the process by which the law regulating civil recovery for injuries has
been fashioned. America's judiciary has been alternatively praised
and damned for its efforts. In areas ranging from the asbestos tragedy
to the silicone breast implant dispute, however, it has been the judges
who have done the difficult, sometimes unpopular job of trying to "fix
what's broke."
Should judges continue in this time-honored tradition? Should they
retreat into some more passive role? If a more passive role is
adopted, what is likely to be the reaction of citizens denied redress by
slow-moving remote legislatures? These and a host of other questions
surrounding the judicial tort lawmaking function are considered in
this, the Fifth Annual Robert A. Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and
Social Policy.
The Symposium begins with Professor Andrew Kaufman of
Harvard discussing Benjamin Cardozo as tort lawmaker. Drawing on
his work as Cardozo's biographer,' Kaufman concludes that while
Cardozo was a champion of the judiciary's authority to make law, he
also emphasized the restraints imposed "by history, by precedent, and
by the powers and responsibilities of the other branches of govern-
ment."'2 Kaufman's piece is followed by two responses, one from
Judge Robert Keeton and the other from Professor Gary Schwartz of
UCLA. Judge Keeton stresses the ever present necessity for good
judges to balance the contending considerations identified by Profes-
sor Kaufman, while Professor Schwartz concentrates our attention on
the limited scope of judicial lawmaking as exemplified in Cardozo's
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University College of
Law, J.D. Harvard University.
1. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998).
2. Andrew L. Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo as Paradigmatic Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 281, 281 (1999).
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work, as well as his allegiance to liability limiting negligence principles
as opposed to notions of strict liability.
Moving the Symposium forward more than seventy-five years,
Professors Theodore Eisenberg of Cornell, Lucinda Finley of SUNY
Buffalo, and Michael Green of Iowa, turn their attention to present-
day judicial lawmaking in products liability cases. Professor Eisen-
berg returns to the topic of his pathbreaking 1990 article, The Quiet
Revolution in Products Liability,3 in which he and co-author, James
Henderson, Jr., identified a shift in federal judicial attitudes in the di-
rection of greater hostility to products liability claims. Updating his
data through 1997, Professor Eisenberg finds that the trends he identi-
fied ten years ago have continued unabated.
Professor Finley follows with a detailed examination of one of the
ways judges have closed the courthouse doors to products liability
plaintiffs. Professor Finley argues that the "gatekeeper" decisions
mandated by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,4 on the
question of expert testimony, have been transformed by federal
judges into a series of "substantive legal rules on causation ' 5 which
have been employed to reject the claims of an array of plaintiffs. Pro-
fessor Green, too, examines the impact of Daubert and its progeny on
the refashioning of products liability law, most particularly in the bur-
geoning field of mass toxic substance litigation. In findings that com-
pliment and reinforce those of Professor Finley, Green suggests that
rulings on the question of expertise have become a key judicial tool in
curbing plaintiffs' claims. The effect has been felt not only in toxic
substance cases, but, in the wake of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,6 in
the full range of tort litigation from exploding tires to silicone gel
breast implants. Professor Marshall Shapo of Northwestern rounds
out the products liability package with a comment on the Eisenberg,
Finley, and Green papers.
Products liability cases are not the only area in which judges have
been busy fashioning new law. In fact, a whole range of issues has
been the subject of judicial innovation. Professor Anita Bernstein of
Chicago-Kent explores this general phenomenon, describing the
"centrifugal" forces that are dispersing tort lawmaking into a host of
different contexts in response to such diverse influences as statutes,
regulations, theories of economic efficiency, market incentives, and
3. 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990).
4. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5. Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their
Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 335 (1999).
6. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
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the technologies facilitating legal research. All have lent impetus to
the growth of new torts-but ones, Bernstein argues, devoid of classi-
cal indicia like a formalistic declaration of elements.
This almost post-modernist vision of a new tort centrifuge is to be
contrasted with the observations made by Professor Robert Rabin of
Stanford, whose paper begins with a look at the growing number of
suits against gun manufacturers and out of these proceedings (as well
as others) discovers a broad-based legal theory involving tort liability
for parties who "enable" others to cause serious harm. Working in the
grand tradition of Prosser, Rabin teases out of the cases a general
principle that explains rulings as diverse as those in negligent entrust-
ment claims, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,7 and
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment, Corp.8 In a brilliant
synthesis Professor Rabin pulls these and other cases, like the Florida
second-hand smoke decision,9 together finding that in all "a danger-
ous 'instrumentality' has been put in the hands of a third-party with a
foreseeable expectation that a 'remote' victim will suffer harm." 10
Here Rabin finds the essence of a new tort.
Professor Stephen Sugarman, of Boalt Hall, takes us from the syn-
thesis of new torts to their dismantling, by examining the recent be-
havior of the California Supreme Court as tort law "un-maker." He
traces the effect of shifts in court personnel that have resulted in Cali-
fornia's highest court abandoning many innovations in tort law. He
explores the "ironic sense'''' in which destruction is the making of
new law with substantial implications for a host of legal doctrines in-
cluding those concerned with products liability, liability for third-party
misbehavior, and the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Pro-
fessor Jeffrey O'Connell of the University of Virginia, follows with not
one, but two lively comments on the tort system and its flaws with
respect to delay and transactional costs.
The next section of the Symposium is devoted to contemporary
judges' views of their role as tort lawmakers. Judge Robert Keeton of
the Federal District Court of Massachusetts, begins this section with
his thoughts on judicial lawmaking. As Judge Keeton points out the
7. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (finding liability possible in the case of a psychotherapist who
failed to warn the intended victim of his patient's murderous intentions).
8. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding liability possible in the case of a landlord who failed
to protect a tenant from the criminal actions of a third-party intruder).
9. Brion v. Philip Morris Co., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
10. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 450 (1999).
11. Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Experience with
"New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 455, 455 (1999).
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courts remain our society's "clean-up crew.' 12 They must deal with
the hard issues left when constitutions and statutes are silent. This, of
course, means that they make a great deal of law. Judge Keeton urges
that we see this as a challenge calling for our most innovative efforts
and highest aspirations. Justice Gregory Scott of Colorado's Supreme
Court then provides a state judge's perspective on these matters. He
emphasizes the complex choreography involved in lawmaking, featur-
ing interactions between legislatures and courts, precedent and re-
form, and appellate and trial judges. He stresses the importance of
harmonizing practical imperatives with ethical and moral expecta-
tions. All these are parts of the unending social dialogue out of which
new law is fashioned.
Professors Richard Abel of UCLA and Marc Galanter of Wisconsin
complete the Symposium's assessment of judges as lawmakers. Pro-
fessor Abel scrutinizes one of the central arguments against judicial
lawmaking-that it is counter-majoritarian and thwarts the efforts of
the democratically-selected legislative representatives of the people.
Professor Abel argues that this proposition is unsound in a range of
contexts. He finds that legislatures are often the captives of special
interests and that legislative deliberations are frequently "secretive,
hasty"'13 and unreasonable. By contrast, it is the courts that are "pop-
ulist and deliberative. ' 14 Based on these observations he argues that
courts should recognize the propriety of their developing the common
law and should carefully scrutinize legislative interference with it.
Professor Marc Galanter points out the importance of realizing that
lawmaking is the domain of the lawyers and trial judges, that appellate
courts "are the carpenters, not the architects, devising solutions to
problems put before them by lawyers."'1 5 The dynamic growth of tort
law reflects not appellate deliberation but the expectations of claim-
ants, the creativity of advocates and the responsiveness of trial judges.
Implicit in all this is the ongoing nature of the process.
The Clifford Symposium concludes with the transcript of a set of
videotaped interviews with Illinois Congressmen Henry Hyde and
Rod Blagojevich and Senators John McCain (Arizona) and Dick
Durbin (Illinois). Although these men hold a number of differing
views on questions of judicial lawmaking, all see its importance and
the necessity for a sharing of effort between legislators and judges.
12. Robert E. Keeton, Reflections on Tort Lawmaking, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 503 (1999).
13. Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 533 (1999).
14. Id.
15. Marc Galanter, Makers of Tort Law, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 559, 564 (1999).
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Presidential hopeful, John McCain, sounds a theme echoed by his col-
leagues when he decries the negative impact of the activities of "spe-
cial interests" on legislative action and sees such intrusions as
increasing the need for and importance of judicial lawmaking. These
legislators' candid discussion underscores the deep roots and ongoing
importance of judges as tort lawmakers in America.
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